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Class forces, transition and the Arab Uprisings: a comparison of  
Tunisia, Egypt and Syria 
Jamie Allinson* 
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This article intervenes into an ongoing debate on authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world following the uprisings of 2011, in particular addressing the perceived 
failure of those uprisings to bring about ‘transition’ to liberal democratic models. 
Drawing upon the method of comparative historical sociology used in seminal 
analyses of democratization and dictatorship in Europe, Asia and the Americas, the 
article seeks to explain the varying trajectories of the Arab Uprising states in terms 
of several structural factors, namely the balance of class forces, the relative 
autonomy of the state and the geo-political context. The article provides an 
empirical comparison of the cases of Egypt, Tunisia and Syria as points on a 
continuum of outcomes following the Arab uprising.  The article mounts a critique 
of the absence of class analysis in mainstream transition theory and hypothesises 
instead an important role for workers’ movements in bringing about even basic 
elements of liberal democracy.  The empirical comparison is shown to support this 
hypothesis, demonstrating that in Tunisia, the state where the worker’s movement 
was strongest a constitutional settlement has been reached while Syria, the state 
with the weakest and least independent workers’ movement has descended into 
counter-revolution and civil war: the case of Egypt lying between these two poles. 
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The prevailing perception of the uprisings that swept the Arab world in late 2010 and early 
2011 is that they have failed to bring about a long-awaited transition to liberal democracy in 
the region. The question has shifted from whether the so-called ‘Arab spring’ overturns 
accepted wisdoms about the Middle East to ‘why did the ‘Arab Spring’ yield so modest a 
harvest?’1 Posing the question in this way returns the study of comparative politics in the 
Arab world to the status quo ante the uprisings: a debate alternating between searching for 
faint signs of 'democratic transition' on the one hand, and the attempt to understand an 
apparently resilient authoritarianism on the other.2  
The intervention of democratization theorists into this long-running debate stresses 
political cultural explanations for the failure of democratic transition, such as the Sultanistic 
character of pre-Uprising regimes, the role of religion in public life3 or the lack of trust, 
rooted in authoritarian inheritances that obstructed negotiated transitions.4 In this article I 
argue that although the case may be made that the Arab revolutions have 'failed' – a 
necessarily shaky conclusion given the historic depth of these events—the transition theorists 
have overlooked an established pattern of agency in previous instances of ‘democratic 
transition’. This is the phenomenon, documented by Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens,5 
of the centrality of the working class, and in particular organized labour, to winning the 
minimal guarantees of civil rights and fairly elected representative government that transition 
theorists consider the essence of democracy.  
This flaw, I argue, is not an accidental oversight but rather derives from the implicit 
assumption of, as Andrea Teti puts it, the ‘democratization framework’s taxonomical end 
point – liberal democracy’. 6 Treating the Arab revolutions as discreet events after which a 
'transition' to this variety of democracy can successfully be negotiated amongst elites, renders 
the institutional set-up and timing of this process the most important factor: ruling out then, 
the political economy analysis of the respective social bases of the actors, an analysis present 
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in the previous work of democratization theorists. 7 This focus on process leads assumed 
division between ‘secular liberals’ or ‘secular democrats’ and Islamists (whose democratic 
credentials are always in question) at the expense of any other division in the societies in 
question, to the extent that very notion of class and political economy literally disappears 
from the analysis. Where structures of political economy do appear, they are largely the 
familiar ones of the rentier state. 8 
The transition approach thus misses the role of the working class, and the strong 
correlation between the strength of labour movements and the winning of minimal democratic 
rights in the region. I argue, drawing on the framework of Rueschemeyer et al’s Capitalist 
Development and Democracy, that a comparison of Egypt, Syria and Tunisia on the basis of 
three ‘clusters of powerthe balance of class forces, the degree of state autonomy, and the 
geopolitical conjuncture -   demonstrates this correlation.9 In keeping with the theme of this 
special issue, the historical sociology of state tangents and their impact on democratization, I 
seek through this comparison to demonstrate that a large part of the variation in the dynamics 
and results of the Arab uprisings matches the degree of mobilization, organization and 
consciousness of workers and their participation in the revolutions. 
The paper proceeds in three parts. First I present a critique of the absence of the role of 
popular classes in democratic transition theory. Second, I outline the alternative posed to 
these underpinnings of approaches by the work of Rueschemeyer et al, and their method of 
comparing the respective power clusters of class forces, state autonomy, and geopolitical 
relations. In the third and final section I present a comparative narrative of the Tunisian, 
Egyptian and Syrian revolutionary processes, demonstrating that the cases with the highest 
degree of independent working class organization have achieved the most in terms of 
representative elections and constitutional freedoms, albeit with a danger of co-optation by 
the ‘deep state’ most evident in Egypt.  
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Democratic transition theory: a critique 
If Arab states are in the midst of a ‘transition’, failed or otherwise, to what endpoint are they 
moving from their prior condition? The endpoints generally adopted in democratization 
studies10 share a common core: essentially liberal, free market, Western democracy of the 
Euro-American type. Democracy thus means a process by which an electorate based on 
universal suffrage approves the circulation of governing elites. The power of these elites is 
notionally circumscribed both in terms of what they can do (guaranteed freedom of 
association, speech, etc.) and the sphere in which they can do it (there is to be no prima facie 
interference in the operative power relationships of the economy, for example.) 
 Democratization for transition theorists results from negotiation between old and new 
elites to produce new institutions on the above model: mass protests, strikes reflecting 
economic discontent may form a crucial variable, but they are refracted through the agency of 
elite actors. 11  Indeed, the prolonging of the popular insurgency characteristic of the 
‘breakthrough’ phase of democratization into the ‘consolidation’ phase may itself threaten the 
transition itself – a concern evident, for example, in some of the democratization analyses of 
Egypt that see the diversion of popular energies away from ‘mass uprising’ and into electoral 
campaigning as a prima facie good.12 
The central variable for transition theorists then becomes the process of negotiation in 
which soft-liners in regime and opposition marginalize hardliners on both sides.’13 Applied to 
the Arab cases, democratic transition theorists see the roots in particular of Egypt's failure to 
emerge as a liberal democracy as lying in the authoritarian inheritance of all actors: whether 
in the insufficient moderation of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood by comparison with the 
Tunisian Nahda, for example; 14the opacity of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) and its preservation of prerogatives over significant parts of the state and the 
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economy; or the continued willingness of the opposition continually to engage in street 
protest.15 In Syria, Stepan and Linz ascribe—with good reason—the ferocity of the state's 
response to what they describe as its 'Sultanistic' nature, binding together the ruling core 
through (rational) fear of the drastic consequences of their fall from power in the context of 
sectarian division.16 The lack of trust between actors, or of effective institutions or correctly 
timed juridical and electoral processes explain the failure to achieve the limited liberal 
democracy assumed to have been demanded by those 'secular liberals’ who constituted the 
protest movements.17  
What are the consequences for democratic transition theory of this engagement with 
the Arab uprisings? Existing critiques focus on its patchy empirical record, or the frequent 
failures of expected processes of transition to unfold as expected.18 Most ‘transition’ states, 
Carothers argued, were not on their way to democracy but rather occupied an intermediate 
position of ‘feckless pluralism or ‘dominant power politics’.19 The ‘stages’ of transition were 
absent in most cases, elections were often a shallow, mechanical exercise and the inherited 
cultural, economic and institutionalmost of all state weaknesslegacies were vitally 
important.20 Although recent work by democratic transition theorists displays a much greater 
sensitivity to the fragility of the (assumed) process of transition, they still tend to reduce the 
actors involved to a schematic triad: the old regime, the Islamists, and ‘secular liberals’. This 
last group, it is implied, represent a middle-class, Westernizing influence and formed the core 
of the uprisings. They explain the ‘modest harvest’ by reference to the insufficient degree of 
mutual toleration or the lack of a liberal democratic, trust-building attitude amongst these 
actors in the transition process.21   
 What is needed is a critique at a deeper level: in the conception of the agency behind 
the uprisings, and the lack of a historical sociology of that agency. Moreover, empirical 
evidence tends to dispute the transition paradigm’s concentration on the above “triad” to the 
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neglect of the popular classes. It is difficult to gauge the arguments of democratization 
theorists on the class character of the Arab world, because the concept appears only rarely in 
the literature. The word ‘Islamist’ appears twelve times in Alfred Stepan’s article on Tunisia 
and ‘secularism’ seven: while ‘trade union’ features once and ‘labour’, ‘worker’ and ‘Union 
Générale Tunisienne du Travail’ (UGTT) not at all, despite the centrality of that organization 
to the fall of Ben Ali.22 In the special issue of the Journal of Democracy (2013) on the modest 
outcomes of the Arab uprisings: references to class are absent, except in the presumption that 
the protestors represented the ‘secular middle class’. The only social cleavages that appear 
consistently in democratization analyses of the Arab uprisings relate to religious identity, 
whether to do with the sect to which one belongs, the degree of observance or the role allotted 
to religious sources of legitimacy in the political order. This perspective not only erases the 
actual dynamics of the uprising: it leaves behind resources in historical sociology that can be 
fruitfully used to understand the present outcomes of the Arab uprisings. 
 
Historical Sociology of Democratization and the Role of the Labour Movement 
The flaws of the democratic transition approach can be remedied with recourse to a different 
tradition in the study of democracy. With roots in the work of Guillermo O'Donnell 23 and 
even further back to Barrington Moore's seminal study, The Social Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy (1966), the political economy approach to the emergence of regime types 
takes a longer and broader view, linking the concerns of democratization, historical sociology 
and state tangents. Of particular relevance here is the body of work, such as Geoff Eley's 
Forging Democracy (2002) and Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens Capitalist 
Development and Democracy (1992) stressing the role of labour movements and the political 
left in winning basic democratic rights.24 
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 While Rueschemeyer et al in particular adopt the same definition of procedural, 
formal liberal democracy as that used by transition theorists,25 seeking to explain the outcome 
and persistence of polyarchy, in Dahl’s sense,26 they criticize transition approaches focus on 
immediate processes rather than on the long-term evolution of power relations that lies behind 
them.27 Instead, they offer the argument that democracy is an outcome of balances of class 
power and class coalitions. In particular three clusters of power relations are central to the 
analysis: the balance between class forces and class coalitions, the relative autonomy of the 
state and 'civil society', and 'transnational power relations'.28  
The large cross-case comparison in Capitalist Development and Democracy found the 
following regularities. First, the most consistent force pushing for democracy was the urban 
working class, except for cases where a charismatic authoritarian leader was able to 
incorporate this layer: this finding matched the expectations of Rueschemeyer et al, given that 
the working class both has an interest in general inclusion of the lower social strata to which it 
belongs, and the mobilizational capacity effectively to demand that inclusion. 29   The 
autonomy of working class organization was thus a key factor in the successful emergence of 
democratic reform. The most consistently anti-democratic class was the landed upper class, 
fearing the loss of reservoirs of cheap labour. A coalition of landlords and bourgeoisie that 
perceived democracy as a threat to their interests was an especially potent anti-democratic 
force.30 The middle class —in the sense of salaried professionals, shopkeepers and other 
intermediate strata  —played an ambiguous role, supporting their own inclusion but hesitant 
about extending political rights to those below them: they formed fodder for alliances either 
with the working class or the upper classes.31 Independent peasants in small-holding countries 
were a mobilizing factor for democracy while agricultural labourers tended to ally with urban 
workers.32  
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  Two further clusters of power are found relevant to the analysis of the balance of class 
forces and class alliances. These are interconnected in the form of  'transnational power 
relations' and the relative autonomy of the state. Geopolitical and economic dependency, 
Rueschmeyer et al find, has a negative effect on the development of democracy partly due to 
the direct effect of foreign interference, aid to boost the repressive power of the military and 
so on, and partly because of the resulting patterns of economic development that hinder the 
emergence and organization of strong labour movements.33 As regards the autonomy of the 
state apparatus, too autonomous a state presses down on the 'dense civil society', particularly 
in the labour movement, which is necessary for democratic gains to be won. A state that is not 
autonomous enough, however, will likely to be under the control of largely anti-democratic 
elements from the landowners and haute bourgeoisie.34 
Across their historical comparison, Rueschemeyer et al find that the correlation 
between capitalist development and democracy is not due to capitalism per sestill less the 
patrimony of a heroic bourgeoisiebut to the struggles engendered within capitalism: 
capitalist development produces and empowers the working class, the most consistently pro-
democratic force, while weakening the most-consistently anti-democratic force of large 
landowners. 35  In a finding germane to the Arab world, Rueschemeyer et al found that 
characteristics of late or uneven development have a strong effect on this pattern: working 
classes in the global south as a general rule being smaller, less organized and less 
differentiated from broader urban masses than in the capitalist core.36 This recognition is 
particularly appropriate in discussing the Arab states, whose economies do not resemble those 
of the classical European cases. As Rueschemeyer, Stevens and Stevens demonstrate, and the 
analysis below supports, it is precisely the differential and uneven nature of capitalist 
development that provides for the foundation of the different outcomes of transition 
processes. This is still capitalist development, albeit in uneven and combined form. Most 
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Arab states lack the large and cohesive working classes that produced European labour 
movements and social-democratic parties but they all depend on some mix of resource 
extraction (for the global capitalist economy), the sale of goods or services produced by free 
employees (whether by state or private firms) or transfer payments from patron states in the 
core capitalist regions. It is these variations in the nature of capitalist development and their 
consequences for class formation that Rueschemeyer et al capture in their argument that in 
‘late developing countries, the relative size of the urban working class is typically smaller 
because of uneven, "enclave" development and because of the related stronger growth of the 
tertiary sector …[meaning] that alliances across class boundaries become critically important 
for the advance of democracy’.37 
Yet, in focusing on a class analysis, does the approach of Rueschemeyer, Stephens 
and Stephens not risk missing dynamics specific to the political arena? Particularly in Arab 
states, cross-class identities and ideologies appear to have more salience: does class analysis 
not neglect these? The first point to note is that almost all transition accounts do have a 
distorted and incomplete class analysis of the Arab uprisings: identifying the uprisings with 
an entity called the ‘secular Westernised middle class’, or its youth, counter-posed, not to 
another class but to an ideological current, Islamism. An explicit class analysis that can then 
be empirically investigated is a necessary corrective. Second, one must distinguish between 
levels of analysis: between the political arena, the events and interactions of which are of 
course contingent, and the collectivities upon which those interactions are based. Sectarian 
heterogeneity in Syria, to take perhaps the toughest challenge to class analysis, is not an 
inherent natural characteristic: it is a socially constructed collectivity produced and 
reproduced through access to the state and the political economy that it oversees. This is not 
to say that sectarian identification is not a significant—at the time of writing the most 
significant—factor in Syrian politics, but that there is a basis in political economy for this 
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salience. One may usefully distinguish between ‘(1) the class structure grounded in the 
organization of production and modified by patterns of mobility and interaction, (2) the ideas 
and attitudes of the members of a class, and (3) the determination and pursuit of collective 
goals through organized action on behalf of a class’.38 The first will always be present; the 
second and third vary, with the extent of sectarian identity or cross-class ideology important 
elements in that variation.  
 How then does this approach aid in answering the question: 'why did the Arab spring 
produce so modest a harvest?' It does so by directing our attention, with some caveats, to the 
three inter-related levels of the balance of class forces and class alliances: the degree of state, 
or more often regime, autonomy within a wider political economy of capital accumulation: 
and the interpenetration of regional and global geopolitical competition. As demonstrated 
below, analysis of three cases most representative of the continuum of outcomes of the Arab 
uprisings, a strong confirmation of the class model emerges. In summary, Tunisia, site of the 
earliest uprising and of the strongest labour movement participation within it, resembles most 
closely the ideal of constitutionally limited representative government, or bourgeois 
democracy. Syria, with both the weakest (recent) record of labour organization and 
consequent low level of working-class participation in the uprising, has entered a path of 
convulsive violence seized by civil war, multi-lateral foreign intervention and the rise of a 
contender to the state itself in the guises of Da”esh, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. 
Egypt lies somewhere between these poles: a popular uprising with significant labour 
participation, followed by the return of a military regime that co-opted part of the leadership 
of the fledgling independent union movement. 
 
 
Comparative case study (1): Tunisia 
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Tunisia is usually seen as closest to the model of democratic transition used in mainstream 
analyses.  Although arguably still far from the demands of ‘bread, freedom and national 
dignity’ Tunisia has achieved a negotiated constitution 39. Although slow in reaching this 
outcome –marked also by confrontations between the Islamists, the Left, and political 
fragments of the ancien régime — the popularly elected Constituent Assembly produced 
broad guarantees of the procedural democracy sought after in democratic transition theory.40 
What are the class interests, class fractions and alliances of classes at play in the 
Tunisian case? At the outset, we immediately encounter a divergence from classic European 
or Latin American cases, the absence of class of large landholders reliant on labour-repressive 
agriculture, whom Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens see as the most consistently anti-
democratic force, particularly when allied to an urban manufacturing bourgeoisie and a 
militarist state. These classic marriages of 'iron and rye' have never characterized the ruling 
classes of the Arab states. Instead, the 1950s and 1960s were characterized by the rise of 
nationalist-minded middle-ranking military officers in a context of wider social turmoil, who 
established, authoritarian populist regimes that embarked on some version of 'passive 
revolution' or 'revolution from above': breaking the power of large-landholders (in some cases 
colonists), enacting redistributive measures in favour of the middle peasantry and 
expropriating the urban merchant bourgeoisie (often from minority communities) in order to 
establish a state-led national capitalism.41 The ruling classes against whom the Arab uprisings 
were directed were thus not the holdovers of a previous mode of production, but the 
comparatively recent mutations of a previous social settlement. Tunisia, unusually, was the 
site of relatively large-scale colonization by European settlers, who controlled around a fifth 
of the arable land 42. Land was redistributed to Tunisians albeit gradually: large holdings did 
develop but, as discussed below, these were outgrowths of an existing capitalist class rather 
than labour-repressive grandees.43 
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By the 1980s, in common with the rest of the region, a new Tunisian leadership (under 
Zine Abidine Ben Ali) turned to a neo-liberal model, especially following an International 
Monetary Fund restructuring plan imposed in 1987.44 It is this generation of a new private and 
state bourgeoisie that was (and remains even now) the predominant class in Tunisia as 
elsewhere. 45 Neoliberal policies of privatization and greater market involvement implied not 
a retreat of the state but rather its recasting.46 Thus, in Tunisia a core ruling group around Ben 
Ali—and particularly his wife Leila Trabelsi—accumulated enormous wealth through the 
state, a relationship that radiated out and down through both the state apparatus and the new 
capitalists close to it.47 Linked to a circuit of largely European capital, 48 this class fraction 
derived its surplus partly from state licensing and property speculation and was linked to large 
agricultural producers: but agriculture as a an export-industry rather than large labour-
repressive estates.49 
At this point, the second two clusters of power discussed in Capitalist Development 
and Democracy come into play. For Rueschemeyer et al, the degree of state autonomy from 
anti-democratic class forces is crucial for the emergence of constitutional democracy—both 
autonomy from economically dominant classes, and from a particular family core of the 
ruling group, (with the opposite usually referred to as ‘Sultanism’ or patrimonialism in the 
broader literature.50 In this respect, the Tunisian state was recognisably very responsive to the 
needs of capital, ensconced within its ruling committees, 51  while the ruling family was 
nonetheless much more separable from the broader interests of this class. Once the UGTT 
strikes became general, threatening the economy with collapse, the Ben Ali-Trabelsi clan 
were jettisoned. The armed forces were unwilling to continue the repression after the 
inflaming of the popular movement by the early violent state response, reflecting the 
independence of the high command.52 This tight web of state, class and familial interest 
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locked out the Islamist bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, who articulated their discontent in a 
universalist language of 'justice'.53  
Rueschemeyer et al’s third cluster, that of the geopolitical constellations of power may 
also be disaggregated along two axes: one of these being the deep structural effects of uneven 
development on the balance of class forces and the other being the conjunctural geopolitical 
interests at play. In the Tunisian case, unlike Egypt and to an even greater extent Syria, the 
latter were almost completely concentrated in one relationship: with the former colonial 
power, France— by extension the European Union and the USA. Ben Ali's repressive laïciste  
regime was considered an important ally in the 'war on terror' and Tunisia formed the 
lynchpin of trans-Mediterranean trade agreements 54. French support in money and materiel 
had long sustained the Ben Ali regime, until the very eve of the uprising.55 The assumption 
that Western influence promotes democracy is undermined by the empirical evidence in this 
case: 56 Nonetheless, the absence of inter-state rivalry over the Tunisian revolution allowed a 
greater space for popular initiatives to push the process forward: a luxury not afforded to 
Syrians, for example.  
 What of the organised labour force identified by Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens as the most consistently democratic force? Outside of Aden, the Tunisian General 
Union of Workers (UGTT) played the most significant role in anti-colonial struggle of any 
Arab state.57 Being an organization of significant social weight, the UGTT is of course no 
monolith: with deep divisions in attitude to the old regime and its remnants, for example, 
between rank and file members and the upper apparatus.  In the post-independence period, the 
UGTT was co-opted into the Bourguibist regime. Even then, the UGTT did retain a degree of 
independence, reflecting the density of its rank and file organization. There were major 
struggles between workers and the regime in 1978 and 1983-4 – the outcome of the latter 
being a weakening of the UGTT.58 The organization persisted, however, and contained within 
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it many activists independent of the regime-linked leadership with experience in significant 
class struggle, and in particular a major strike at the Gafsa mine. This was to become crucial 
in the 2010-11uprising. The UGTT was, of course, not the sole actor in the Tunisian 
revolution: the motive force came from a heterogeneous revolutionary subject on the streets. 
However, it would be almost impossible to find another organization—not even the Islamist 
Nahda party, which was relatively marginal at the beginning of the revolt— that played as 
consistently significant a role as the UGTT. In this aspect Tunisia did indeed differ starkly 
from the other cases. Indeed, it was networks of UGTT activists that spread the uprising from 
the impoverished interior to the main cities, and organized the strike wave that finally put paid 
to Ben Ali’s rule.59  
 How did the role of the organised working class then affect the 'transition' period in 
Tunisia? First, pressure from the lower ranks of the UGTT was significant in forcing a more 
thorough purge of the ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) 
(forcing the resignation of the union’s ministers in the first post-Ben Ali cabinet), by 
comparison to Egypt where the cadres of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) 
resurfaced in another guise. The union also lead the protests that won the commitment to an 
elected National Constituent Assembly in October 2011.60 Thirdly, when in these elections, 
the Islamist Ennahda won a plurality and governed as part of a ‘troika’ with the social 
democratic Takatol and liberal Congress for the Republic, unleashing a tripartite struggle 
among the Islamists (rooted in a fraction of the upper bourgeoisie, and with very wide cadres 
of petty bourgeois support), the remnants of the old regime, and the popular revolutionary 
movements, the union federation in Tunisia, unlike in Egypt, was the undeniable core of the 
latter. As Ennahda came into government, and the class struggles that had ignited the uprising 
continued (for example giving rise to mass strikes in towns such as Kesserine and Siliana) the 
hostility between the workers’ movement and associated leftist parties, and the Islamists 
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sharpened, particularly following the assassination of Leftist politicians by presumed 
Islamists. Fourth, however, the UGTT leadership, along with the employers’ organization and 
others played a mediating role in a ‘national dialogue’ that brought about the conclusion of 
the constitution, the ‘technocratic’ government under former industry minister Mehdi Joma’a 
and the promise of further parliamentary and presidential elections on the constitutional 
basis. 61  Workers, therefore, played the decisive role in setting Tunisia on the road to 
democratic transition. 
 
Comparative Case Study (2): Egypt 
At the time of writing (early 2015), Egyptian politics seems to have returned to a more highly 
repressive version of the status quo ante the 25th of January 2011, with a heavier dose of 
nostalgia for the high water mark of Egyptian power in the 1950s and 60s. Lacking the 
developmental resources or redistributive policies of that time, the success of this austerity 
Nasserism cannot be vouchsafed. Nonetheless, as described below, this discourse has had a 
significant effect in binding parts of the independent labour movement to the state. How did 
Egypt's 'transition'—never a propitious undertaking so long as the deep structures of the 
regime remained intact, if damaged—reach this bind? A flawed process definitely played a 
part, but the Egyptian trajectory reaches much further back.  
 As in Tunisia, by 2011 in Egypt, the locus of class differentiation had become urban 
rather than agrarian: after years of contradictory land reform initiatives, the countryside was 
dominated by property speculators and agro-capitalists rather than agrarian magnates 
dependent on semi-servile labour.62 Who then composed the ruling class—those with most to 
lose— of Egypt in 2011? Again, the Egyptian case presents a fuller development of the 
Tunisian: an interlocking core of state-licensed and connected capital and the repressive state 
apparatus following more than three decades of infitah.63  As well as the core group of 
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nouveaux riches, Egypt's private sector was long-standing enough to produce a business class 
not directly imbricated with the Mubarak family, but who closely identified with state when it 
was under threat.64 Second, the Egyptian military itself had become a bourgeoisie-in-arms, 
controlling vast stretches (estimates varying between ten and forty per cent) of the economy.65  
 The final group, as in Tunisia, was the Islamist bourgeoisie. Largely excluded from 
the patronage of the regime, these pious industrialists developed their own commercial 
networks reaching deep down into local neighbourhoods and attracting the petit bourgeois 
who had long formed the core of Islamist support.66 Of course, the appeal of Islamist ideology 
(in Brotherhood or Salafist form) spreads beyond a specific class, as does any ideology. To 
describe the Brotherhood as a bourgeois force with petit bourgeois and mass support does not 
mean a perfect congruity between these classes and the organization: it refers to the 
orientation of the group, the structural class position of its leading members and the class 
impact of the political economy envisaged by its ideology. On all these measures, the 
Brotherhood can reasonably be considered a bourgeois force, with a middle class periphery. 
Its leading members are themselves wealthy entrepreneurs and it derives its funding from 
donations (and external states) rather than from organized labour.67 It orients its political work 
on commercial organizations and professional syndicates. Its electoral support amongst the 
urban poor is based on a passive relationship: ideological identification, to be sure, but also 
influence won by charitable services. Its stance on economic issues envisages a market 
economy, ‘just’ wages ensured by scriptural sanction rather than worker self-organization and 
the removal of impediments to the fair operation of the market.68 All ideologies contain some 
element of cross-class appeal—they would not be ideologies if they did not—but they do so 
in order to identify broader layers with an organization that has definite class content. 
The history of the Egyptian revolution can thus to some extent be read through the 
fortunes of these class fractions: the military capitalists removing the Mubarak clique when it 
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became clear the mass uprising against them threatened wider interests. This was to become 
crucial when the mass protests of the 18 days coalesced with a strike wave that penetrated the 
military enterprises themselves on the 10th and 11th of February 2011: at this point, as in 
Tunisia, the military simply rid themselves of Mubarak. The resulting rule of the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces, presented as 'transition' what was actually a road-map to the 
restoration of the deep state.69  The military and Islamists briefly converged around their 
shared animosity Gamal Mubarak’s crony capitalist faction, only later to split, leading to the 
exclusion of the Islamists.  
In relation to the geopolitical conjuncture, where Tunisia saw a largely uni-directional 
relationship, Egypt—a far larger and more important state—was subject to a largely one-way 
influence at the global level and intra-Gulf competition at the regional level. Since Sadat's 
turn away from Soviet influence in the 1970s, the US had formed the major sponsor of the 
regime and in particular the Egyptian military. This relationship remained in place after the 
'18 Days'. The US government's call for an  'orderly transition' (to Mubarak's appointed 
deputy Omar Soleiman) undoubtedly signalled that Mubarak had become a liability.70 The 
Obama administration showed a brief interest in the Muslim Brotherhood as a force for 
stability, 71 only to decline to use the word 'coup' or strongly condemn the renewed repression 
after June 30th 2013. At the regional level, the intervention of Gulf oil states into the post-
Egyptian revolutionary scene was much more competitive. In broad-brush strokes, Qatar 
funded and supported the Muslim Brotherhood, while the Saudis backed either Salafi groups 
as a counterweight to its rivals' influence, or retained their relationship with the Egyptian 
military. 72  This aspect confirms a further hypothesis of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens: the influx of resources flowed not to the labour movement or subaltern classes but 
to other class forces. The flow of external resources thus empowered the authoritarian military 
and the Muslim Brotherhood, squeezing out the original revolutionary forces of the uprising. 
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 What of the role of those subaltern classes, and in particular, the working class in the 
Egyptian revolution? Although numerically large, Egypt's formally employed and organised 
working class is still a minority compared to the informal sector and those in ‘vulnerable 
employment’. 73   From the Free Officers’ coup until the strike wave that preceded the 
revolution, Egyptian unions were state-controlled.74 Yet, more than 1.7 million workers took 
part in more than 1,900 strikes and other protests (in the absence of free unions) between 
2004 and 2008.75 It was this strike wave that began to weaken the barrier of fear, prefiguring 
the revolution of 2011. A new independent organization emerged: the Egyptian Independent 
Trade Union Federation (EITUF), which was to play a significant role both before and after 
the fall of Mubarak. It was, to be sure, massive demonstrations that (at least temporarily) 
broke the power of the police apparatus, rather than strikes, although workers were present on 
them. However, the final days of Mubarak’s reign, the 10th and 11th of February marked a 
huge increase in strike activity. A general strike called on Wednesday the 9th of February 
spread quickly even to the military production facilities:  at this point, the core ruling 
apparatus decided to dispense with Mubarak and declare the rule of the Supreme Council of 
the Armed Forces. The level of labour actually increased after this. There were 1,400 
recorded collective labour actions in 2011; 1,969 in 2012 and 2,400 in the first quarter of 
2013.76  
Yet what did not occur was the much anticipated ‘passing-over’ of workers’ struggles 
into a general challenge to the state. The uprising of the ‘18 days’, and of the succeeding 18 
months, but did not destroy the deep state. The movement against Morsi was much more 
contradictory, including both those who wanted to extend the revolution and those who 
sought to roll it back. The workers movement did not become an indispensable central actor 
but remained caught in the struggle between the deep state and the (business-oriented) 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
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In part this outcome was the result of the predominant set of politics and institutional 
heritage of the workers’ movement. The movement remained divided and dominated the old 
regime unions controlling the pension funds and other institutional sources of power. The 
dominant political element was committed to the side of the state against the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a hangover of nationalist corporatism. Thus Kamal abu Eita, leader of EITUF 
became the first minister of labour in the post-coup government.77 Hamdeen Sabahi, standard-
bearer of the nationalist Left, and winner of a fifth of the vote in the 2012 presidential 
election, supported the coup of the 3rd of July 2013. 
The key force that Rueschemyer, Stephens and Stephens identify as winning minimal 
democratic reforms was thus in Egypt hampered by its institutional legacy, and by the 
predominant politics of attachment to the state. Yet might there have been even deeper 
reasons behind the social character of the Egyptian revolution: urban and popular, involving 
workers and strikes, but not a workers’ revolution as such? Mention has already been made of 
the vast rural-urban migration that Egypt experienced as a result of policies of ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ on the land: a set of policies replicated in urban areas also.78 The expanding 
urban and peri-urban population were not, for the most part, moving to steady waged 
employment in organised workplaces, but to semi, under, and unemployment. Indeed, much 
of the pre-revolutionary strike wave was directed against policies of deregulation, 
privatisation and ‘precarization’.79  
In the context of a strong, independent and politically-oriented trade union movement 
a revolutionary subject of this sort could end up winning minimal democratic demands, as in 
Tunisia. A difficult balance prevailed: the necessary conditions being that the labour 
movement and its allies are strong enough to be threatening, but equally that the leadership of 
that movement is willing to reduce its demands to a degree that will not threaten the 
privileged strata. For all its efforts, the Egyptian workers’ movement did not reach this level, 
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leaving the revolution in a more high-stakes position: either to crack open the deep state and 
establish some other institutions of rule (presumably to the detriment of the bourgeoisie 
clustered around that state) or retreat in the face of the return of its return. In the end, Egypt 
took the latter path. 
 
Comparative Case Study (3): Syria 
Syria lies at the other end of the continuum from Tunisia. At the time of writing, the 
unyielding counter-revolution of the Assad regime looked close to triumph: or at least to 
transforming the revolution into a conflict with its Sunni chauvinist enemies, and in some 
cases former clients, such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.80 The origins of this 
divergence are usually sought in the history of religious and linguistic divisions in Syria, and 
the accompanying vulnerability of the state to external interference: these are certainly 
important factors, but as I seek to demonstrate below, they intersect with and operate on the 
terrain of political economy. Sectarian identity is vital to understanding the Syrian crisis, but 
it is not an a priori variable that precedes processes of political economy and authoritarian 
state-building: as demonstrated below it acquires meaning and salience through those 
processes. 
 The history of the Syrian regime and its ruling economic interests presents broadly 
similar story to that of Egypt, Tunisia and other formerly radical republics. As in Tunisia and 
Egypt, the large landlords and urban notables were dispossessed in the 1960s: the 
mobilisation of poor peasants merging with the more urban Ba'ath during this period.81 What 
made its trajectory somewhat different was that whereas Egypt and Tunisia made decisive 
turns to the West and market policies in the late 1970s, Hafez Al-Assad's 'corrective 
movement' was directed against the Ba'ath Left but was accompanied by far less overt 
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marketisation.82 The neoliberal moment in Syria came later, its tentative beginnings in the last 
years of Assad pere, then accelerated under Bashar.83 
 A result, intersecting with the dynamics (and instrumental use) of sectarian 
identification, has been a Syrian bourgeoisie especially stratified by its access to the state.84 
Bassem Haddad refers to these as ‘the new economic elite’ (in both state and private 
varieties), the old bourgeoisie, and the independent businesspeople.85 The former group is, 
unsurprisingly, largely Alawite, and where not identical to the political and military 
leadership of the state, stands in solidarity with it. Although Bassem Haddad describes this as 
a state elite, it must also be recognised that to perhaps an even greater degree than other 
dictatorial clans, the Assads (and the Makhloufs) acquired an enormous slice of the country's 
wealth through covert privatization programmes. Rami Makhlouf, Hafez' brother-in-law, has 
been reported to control 60% of Syria’s economic activity 86. Even if this is an overestimate, 
it is certain that Makhlouf controls significant sectors of the liberalised Syrian economy, such 
as mobile telephone networks that became a target for protests in the early days of the 
revolution.87 
Within the ‘new economic elite’ there are both inner and outer layers. The outer 
sections of regime-linked capital, as opposed to the old merchant families, established 
themselves in the high period of Syrian dirigisme in the 1970s and 1980s and moved with the 
times, becoming private businessmen as the economy was neoliberalized.88This group is more 
widely spread, and less directly connected to the ruling family.89 Religious minorities feature 
but there are also representatives of the Sunni majority. However, their reliance on closeness 
to the regime ensures their loyalty.  
 The Syrian old bourgeoisie began as urban merchants and remain concentrated in 
textiles and internal trade.90 Largely, if not exclusively Sunni, this group and its periphery 
formed the backbone of opposition to Ba'athist radicalism in the 1960s.91A non-aggression 
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pact of sorts prevailed afterwards between an Alawite state elite on the one hand and a Sunni 
economic elite on the other—albeit with the distrust between the two hampering further 
neoliberalisation.92 The attitude of the old bourgeoisie to the Syrian revolution seems to have 
been one of wary vacillation.  
 As in the previous two cases, class formation at the top of Syrian society is tied into 
both the degree of autonomy of the state and geopolitical relations. In Syria the connection of 
state, regime and family (and therefore also sect) was the closest of all our examples.93 The 
hard core of securocrats and connected businessmen were drawn from the same community, 
in a relationship that then cascaded down through the state apparatus. This structure is often 
ascribed to sectarianism, but the relationship can be said to work the other way: Hafez al-
Assad carefully constructed the sharp edge of the state so that his clientele, most often kin and 
co-religionists, controlled the key positions. 94  Fear of the resentment provoked by this 
perceived privilege among the Sunni majority would serve to bind the minorities, and 
particularly the Alawites, to the ruling core even as they suffered the same political repression 
as other Syrians.95 This strategy has proved extremely successful. 
 The pre-2011 Syrian state was of course not a purely Alawite preserve. However, it 
formed a kind of escape pod for the ruling core: as the uprising spread, the hardliners 
sloughed off the less loyal parts of the armed forces in particular—some of which went on to 
become the Free Syrian Army—until only the tougher sectarian nucleus was left.96 This had 
the result of shoring up Bashar al-Assad, but also of causing the fracture and retreat of the 
state itself from many parts of the country.  
These dynamics were linked to Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens’ final power 
cluster: the geopolitical conjuncture. Syria experienced particularly severe competition from 
both the regional and global levels, as the uprising intersected with regional and global new 
cold wars. Russia, Iran and Iraq backed the Assad regime to the hilt: Saudi Arabia and Qatar 
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fought out their rivalry with each other in the battlefields and halls of the opposition, while 
sharing an enemy in Iran. The Western powers maintained a rhetorical commitment to the 
overthrow of Assad—much as he had maintained a rhetorical commitment to anti-
imperialism—while remaining wary of dispensing weaponry. This external involvement also 
increased the sectarian threat to the uprising, as the regime retreated ever more to its non-
Sunni rump, with the hardest fighting done by Iraqi and Lebanese Shia militias trained by 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards.97 Likewise, Gulf funding flowed to the more conservative 
Sunni elements.98 The most isolated and underfunded forces were those who had begun the 
uprising under the banner of a democratic and secular Syria.  
 The array of internal and external forces aligned against the Syrian uprising was 
formidable: it was not matched by organized challenge from a labour movement on the other 
side. To a greater degree even than in Egypt, any scope for independent rank and file action 
had been crushed by the time of the uprising. There was no equivalent of Gafsa, or Mahalla: 
strikes or uprisings preceding a broader revolt.  Following Bashar's neoliberal reforms, the 
Syrian trade unions lost even the limited access to the state they had held under Hafez.99  Left 
parties were occasionally tolerated where they represented little threat or could be used as a 
counterweight to Islamists: or (very successfully) incorporated into the ‘anti-imperialist’ 
regime. In the absence of independent political or economic organization (crushed by the 
weight with which the regime fell on all elements of civil society), it is unsurprising that little 
open working class struggle took place in Syria prior to the uprising. The corporatist state 
unions were used to mobilize shows of support for Bashar al-Assad.100 Local strikes occurred 
but nothing on the scale of Tunisia or Egypt. 
 The class nature of the Syrian revolution was evident rather in a geographical split. 
The centres of opposition were mainly provincial centres and small towns (largely Sunni) that 
suffered the neglect and drought of the 2000s: the revolution encroached on the cities from 
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the countryside, and on the centre of the cities from their destitute peripheries. Where the 
Syrian state fractured, its collapse was much deeper than in any of the other Arab revolutions: 
but the areas involved were geographically limited. The heart of this self-organisation was the 
Local Co-ordination Committees composed of activists directing demonstrations, in some 
cases merged with local committees formed to take over state functions, which then 
constituted higher levels of governance. 101  Parts of Syria saw the first free elections for 
decades and a degree of popular autonomy perhaps greater than in any other of the Arab 
revolutions. These bodies sometimes proclaimed social reforms reversing the policies of the 
Bashar years.102 
 However, this geographic limitation proved a fatal weakness. With no nationwide 
organisation such as the UGTT and the external opposition was fractured into competing 
groups,103 the revolution internally was locked into an unavoidable military struggle with the 
regime 104  allowing the limited pockets of revolutionary Syria to be crushed from two 
sources.105 On the one hand the regime, with the advantage of time and resources from its 
Iranian and Russian backers was able to grind out a siege of the liberated areas until morale 
inevitably collapsed. On the other, sectarian forces such as Da’esh—opposed by the 
revolutionaries and ambiguous in its relationship to the regime—took advantage of the power 
vacuum in the liberated areas to replace Ba'thist authoritarianism with their own even grislier 
version. 
 
Conclusion 
Where does the comparative study of the balance of class forces and class alliances, histories 
of state autonomy and geopolitical conjunctures lead in the study of state tangents in the wake 
of the Arab uprisings? Representing as they do extreme and mid-points along a continuum of 
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outcomes of the revolutionary uprisings, examination of these three cases using the approach 
of Capitalist Development and Democracy yields instructive conclusions. 
 To recapitulate these: ‘bourgeois’ democracy most often accompanies proletarian 
organizational strength. Tunisia’s constitutional settlement does not solely derive from the 
presence of the UGTT but, as demonstrated above, the organization did play a crucial role. In 
Syria, by contrast, there was no independent labour organization (despite an impressive 
previous history) to spread the popular uprising across the territory of the state. Of course, the 
uprising did spread, especially in the form of sympathy demonstrations for besieged cities: 
however, these never penetrated central Damascus in particular. Egypt formed a middle case, 
with an independent union movement playing a strong role in the revolution, but its 
leadership eventually siding with the ancien régime in its struggle with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
 These differences interacted with degrees of state autonomy and geopolitical interest. 
The Tunisian state, although not autonomous of capital, certainly had a degree of distance 
from the ruling clan and a uni-directional relationship with an external power. The Egyptian 
state, and its core in the armed forces, had an even greater stake in the economy but precisely 
for that reason a greater need to dispense with the Mubarak clique when they became a 
liability to the operation of these interests. Syria suffered an unhappy confluence of factors: a 
greater unity of state, ruling clique and business interests on the one hand and a particularly 
sharp geopolitical competition over the fate of the country on the other. 
 Democratic transition theory has sought explanations for the ‘failure’ of the Arab 
revolutions in the nature of the ‘transition’ negotiations and secular-Islamist but while these 
may have their part to play, as this article has sought to demonstrate, even the most minimal 
democratic guarantees are only likely when classes with the least to lose are weak, and those 
with the most to gain are strong. 
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